POLICYMAKER RECEPTIVITY TO CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AS INFLUENCED BY ACTIVISTS
ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers the role of shareholder resolutions and employee strikes as representations of activist activities targeting corporations and their influence on corporate political activity (CPA). The study builds from the McDonnell and Werner (2016) study in Administrative Science Quarterly, 鈥淏lacklisted businesses: Social activists鈥 challenges and the disruption of corporate political activity,鈥 which assessed the role of consumer boycotts vis-脿-vis CPA. Starting with the political marketplace framework, introducing the policy relationship framework, and using signal theory, the dissertation found some support that shareholder resolutions and employee strikes related to increases in PAC refunds, that temporal issue salience to the public of a shareholder resolution issue increased PAC refunds and decreased congressional testimony, that media coverage and company reputation may increase CPA (contrary to the study鈥檚 prediction), and that lobbying may decrease in the face of activist activity paired with reductions in other CPA (also contrary to the study鈥檚 prediction). The study concludes that, based on the relationships found, activist activities (shareholder resolutions and strikes) generate signals received by policymakers regarding the relationship between the public and companies. This conclusion provides additional examples of signal theory in politics and an example of the policy relationship framework鈥檚 assertion that the relationship between public and company can influence the relationship between company and policymaker. The study used a quasi-experimental difference-in-difference design based on treatment and control groups constructed through coarsened exact matching. The study used data following the Citizens United Supreme Court ruling that upended campaign finance in the U.S. (2010-2023).